Fordham Law Review
Volume 91

Issue 1

Article 4

2022

Second Service: 28 U.S.C. § 1448 and State Court Service of
Process After Removal
Leigh Forsyth
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Leigh Forsyth, Second Service: 28 U.S.C. § 1448 and State Court Service of Process After Removal, 91
Fordham L. Rev. 165 (2022).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol91/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SECOND SERVICE: 28 U.S.C. § 1448 AND STATE
COURT SERVICE OF PROCESS AFTER REMOVAL
Leigh Forsyth*
28 U.S.C. § 1448 governs the requirements of process after removal,
providing that when defendants are not completely or perfectly served prior
to removal, plaintiffs may complete such process or service, or new process
may be issued in the same manner as in cases originally filed in the district
court. There remains an open question as to whether state court service
issued prior to removal, but served after removal, retains its efficacy in
federal court under § 1448. This open question has led to divergent
interpretations among district courts, with differing consequences. As of this
Note’s publication, at least twenty-seven district courts and one circuit court
have grappled with this question and reached various interpretations of
§ 1448: at least twelve courts have analyzed the text of § 1448 and concluded
that state court process after removal is not permitted under § 1448, and at
least eleven have concluded the opposite—that state court process should
retain its efficacy after removal. At least six courts are somewhere in the
middle.
This Note explores these different interpretations and attempts to resolve
the open question of § 1448 in advocacy of permitting completion of state
court service of process after removal. The Note attempts to link the different
district and circuit court opinions through the themes of federalism, statutory
interpretation, notice provided to the defendant through service, and priority
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after removal. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that these goals are furthered through completion of state court
service of process after removal under § 1448, and posits a solution under
Rule 4(m) that would ensure plaintiffs’ cases are heard on the merits, rather
than the technicalities of removal procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 1988, Jeffrey Wade filed a products liability suit against
the company Black Clawson in New Jersey state court.1 Mr. Wade then
attempted to serve the company at its New York City offices by personally
delivering his complaint to the company’s assistant to the Vice President
himself, rather than through an intermediary, such as a process server.2 Black
Clawson then filed a Notice of Removal, and Mr. Wade’s case was removed
to federal court in the District of New Jersey.3 This was when Mr. Wade’s
procedural headache truly began.
Once the case was removed, Black Clawson filed a motion for summary
judgment, or alternatively, a motion to dismiss the complaint for improper
service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(5) (“Rule
12(b)(5)”).4 One month after Black Clawson filed its motion, Mr. Wade
attempted service again.5 Mr. Wade served Black Clawson’s Vice President
with a state court summons and complaint via regular and certified mail, and
two days after that, served the Vice President with the state court summons
and complaint via a process server.6
Black Clawson argued that the first service before removal was defective
under New Jersey court rules, and, importantly, that the services after
removal were invalid under 28 U.S.C. § 1448 because Mr. Wade had served
the state court summons, rather than a federal court summons. 7 Mr. Wade
argued that all services were valid.8 The New Jersey district court agreed
with both of Black Clawson’s arguments.9
Mr. Wade’s service prior to removal was defective under New Jersey court
rules, but the New Jersey district court also held that the two attempts after
removal were invalid as well, even though Mr. Wade had seemingly cured
the defects from his first attempt at service.10 The District of New Jersey
found that the service of a state court summons after removal was invalid on
its face according to § 1448 because only service of process pursuant to
federal procedure was permitted after removal.11 Because of this incurable

1.
1989).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Wade v. Black Clawson, No. 89-2385, 1989 WL 138735, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 17,
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *5.
See id.
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mistake, Black Clawson’s motion to dismiss for failure to properly serve was
granted and Mr. Wade’s complaint was dismissed.12
The consequences of Mr. Wade’s procedural predicament were harsh but
not uncommon to plaintiffs in the same situation. The plain text of § 1448
has generated a split in authority regarding whether state court process issued
prior to removal can be served after removal, or if the plaintiff must serve a
summons from the federal court under FRCP 4 (“Rule 4”).
Some federal courts have interpreted this ambiguity in § 1448 to require a
plaintiff to file a new summons and complaint in federal court if service of
the state court summons and complaint was not completed before removal or
if such service was defective. This ambiguity largely arises from the
interpretation of the final clause in § 1448, which provides that incomplete,
imperfected, or defective service “may be completed or new process issued
in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court.”13
Courts that have interpreted § 1448 to forbid completion of state court service
of process post-removal focus on the notion that the federal court has taken
jurisdiction from the state court after the notice of removal is filed, the
primacy of federal procedure following removal, the insufficiency of notice
provided to the defendant through state court process, and the statutory
language “in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district
court.”14 On the other hand, courts interpreting § 1448 to allow post-removal
completion of incomplete or ineffective state court service of process
emphasize that defendants usually have actual notice of the suit, and that the
statutory language of “may be completed” and supporting canons of statutory
interpretation compel such a reading.
Plaintiffs who fall victim to these divergent interpretations often must
re-serve the defendant(s) more than once (regardless of how the court
interprets § 1448), and occasionally, the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed entirely
for inadequate service, either to be refiled or given up. These complications
result in unnecessary expense to the plaintiffs, prolonged litigation, and can
result in the plaintiff’s case never being heard on its merits.
This Note provides a survey of courts that have analyzed and decided
issues of service under § 1448, ultimately advocating that plaintiffs should
not be subject to added burdens as § 1448 permits completion of service of
state court process after removal. Part I describes the history of removal,
including how the federal courts view their jurisdiction over removed cases
and the procedure for removing a case from state to federal court. Part I also
recounts the legislative history of § 1448 and explains how the problem of
service pre- and post-removal has developed and been addressed by
Congress. Finally, Part I details the tools of statutory interpretation most
commonly applied in interpreting § 1448 and provides some background on
how district courts typically approach such issues of statutory interpretation.

12. Id. at *5–6.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1448.
14. Id.
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Part II surveys the courts that have addressed the problem of whether state
court service of process can be completed after removal, starting with the
highest court to address § 1448 process after removal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Beecher v. Wallace.15 Part II also discusses
the legacy of Beecher’s interpretation, describing the courts that have
followed and departed from Beecher’s interpretive framework. Finally, Part
II analyzes how themes of federalism, statutory interpretation, authority of
federal procedure, and the purpose of service of process are reconsidered by
subsequent courts when detangling § 1448.
Part III ultimately concludes that state court service of process must retain
its efficacy after removal based on an interpretation of the plain language of
§ 1448. Such an interpretation is also consistent with how federal courts have
historically understood their removal jurisdiction, the original purpose of
§ 1448, adjacent provisions in the statutory scheme for removal, the purpose
of the FRCP, and the requirements of Rule 4 service. Part III also proposes
a good cause exemption for § 1448 under Rule 4(m), to further the policy of
the statute while still allowing for courts to protect valid concerns of notice
provided by service and without dismissing plaintiff’s case entirely.
I. THE INTERPLAY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS AND REMOVAL
Removal is the process by which a defendant may unilaterally elect to
move a suit pending against them in state court to federal court if the district
court has original jurisdiction over the matter.16 Approximately 32,000 civil
cases are removed annually.17 This part provides background on labyrinthine
removal procedure, § 1448’s place in that labyrinth, and how district courts
typically and historically have interpreted relevant statutes. It is worth
starting with how removal came to be and what procedural hurdles both
plaintiffs and defendants must jump over before and after removal.
A. A Brief History of Removal and Removal Scholarship
Removal is not a creature of common law or constitutional right, nor is it
a constitutionally granted power of the judiciary; rather, it is a purely
statutory construction.18 Removal of cases from state court was first
permitted for diversity jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act of 178919 and has

15. 381 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1967).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
17. See Table E-8—U.S. District Courts—Civil Judicial Business (September 30, 2021),
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-8/judicial-business/2021/09/30
[https://perma.cc/VE9K-Q55E] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022) (click on “DOWNLOAD DATA
TABLE”) (reflecting that, in 2021, 32,275 of the total filings in federal district courts were
notices of removal).
18. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 349 (1816) (“This power of removal is
not to be found in express terms in any part of the constitution . . . .”); JAMES HAMILTON
LEWIS, REMOVAL OF CAUSES 103–06 (1923) (collecting cases and explaining the statutory
right of removal).
19. Ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80.
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endured in the United States Code since.20 The removal statutes, however,
have proven to be a labyrinth of procedure since their inception. “That there
is no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many refinements and
subtleties, as relate to removal proceedings, is known by all who have to deal
with them.”21
Removal, as it was first conceived, was available both before and after
final judgment in state court,22 for suits commenced against “an alien,”23 and
for suits in which citizens of one state brought suit against citizens of another
state in matters where the amount in controversy exceeded $500.24 Cases
were removable to the next appellate court in the district where the state court
suit was pending.25
Removal from federal to state court was a cause of concern during the
adoption of the U.S. Constitution and the passing of the Judiciary Act of 1789
for Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, particularly as it related to diversity
jurisdiction.26 But by the early 1880s, federal courts accepted removal and
removal procedure, and the U.S. Supreme Court “in no uncertain terms”
protected removal as a power conferrable by Congress.27
Despite widespread adoption and protection from the Supreme Court,
debate continued as to how federal courts obtained jurisdiction over removed
cases.28 Justice Joseph Story believed that federal courts had appellate
jurisdiction over removed cases, meaning that a state court’s original
jurisdiction had already attached before removal, and federal courts retained
only appellate jurisdiction over the removed case.29 This understanding was
informed by the fact that when section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
authorizing removal was enacted, “a suit already tried to jury verdict in state
court could be removed to federal court and there retried by federal judges.”30
Thus, the power of removal was “certainly not” an exercise of original

20. See Debra Lyn Basset & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of Removal, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“[T]he U.S. legal landscape has included removal since the creation of
federal courts . . . .”). Removal procedure is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1455.
21. Hagerla v. Miss. River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912).
22. See generally 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1745 (2d. ed. 1923).
23. Thomas H. Lee, Article IX, Article III, and the First Congress: The Original
Constitutional Plan for the Federal Courts, 1787–1792, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1895, 1914–15
(2021).
24. Id.
25. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79; see also Lee, supra note 23, at 1914.
26. See Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609,
612–19 (2004); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 553 (Alexander Hamilton) (Easton Press ed., 1979)
(“But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable to those descriptions
of causes of which the State courts have previous cognizance [(i.e., in diversity jurisdiction
cases)]. . . . [F]or not to allow the State courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly
be considered as the abridgment of a preëxisting authority.”).
27. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 348–49 (1816).
28. Compare 2 STORY, supra note 22, § 1745, with Ry. Co. v. Whitton’s Adm’r, 80 U.S.
270, 287 (1871), and Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265–66 (1879).
29. 2 STORY, supra note 22, § 1745.
30. Lee, supra note 23, at 1937.
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jurisdiction because “it presupposes an exercise of original jurisdiction to
have attached elsewhere.”31
The Supreme Court called Justice Story’s logic into question decades later,
suggesting that removal could “more properly be regarded as an indirect
mode by which the Federal court acquires original jurisdiction of the
causes.”32 The Supreme Court has since remained firm on this view of
removal jurisdiction, stating that “the jurisdiction exercised on removal is
original not appellate.”33
Of course, whether one characterizes the removal jurisdiction as original
or appellate, removal jurisdiction is “by definition” one by which the federal
and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.34 Removal as concurrent
jurisdiction views the federal and state courts as having overlapping authority
to adjudicate the claim.35
Regardless of what form federal jurisdiction takes over a removed case,
both plaintiffs and defendants must comply with the procedural requirements
of removal set forth in title 28 of the U.S. Code (the “Judicial Code”) and the
FRCP because, post-removal, the case is solely within the federal judicial
system.
B. Removal Mechanics and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The procedure for removal of actions from state to federal court is detailed
in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1450.
Generally, cases based on diversity of citizenship and/or cases over which
the district courts have original jurisdiction are eligible for removal.36 A
defendant seeking such removal must file a “short and plain statement of
grounds for removal” with a district court, along with “all process, pleadings,
and orders served upon . . . defendant or defendants.”37 Once the notice is
filed, the defendant must give notice to all adverse parties and file a copy
with the state court.38 If a defendant removes a case after other defendants
are served, earlier-served defendants must give their consent to the
removal.39 After the notice is filed, the state court is barred from proceeding
with the case “unless and until” the case is remanded.40
31. 2 STORY, supra note 22, § 1745.
32. Whitton’s Adm’r, 80 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added).
33. Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 452 (1943) (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313, 320 (1879)).
34. See Basset & Perschbacher, supra note 20, at 5–6.
35. See Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[A]ll types
of civil actions, in which there is concurrent original jurisdiction in both federal and state
courts, are removable.”).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted §§ 1441, 1445, and 1447
as establishing a policy of “avoiding interruption of the litigation of the merits of removed
causes, properly begun in state courts” in the context of reviewability of orders to remand.
United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1946).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
38. Id. § 1446(d).
39. Id. § 1446(b)(2)(C).
40. Id. § 1446(d).
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District courts are authorized to “issue all necessary orders and process”
to bring all proper parties before the court, even if they were served with state
court process.41 But all orders, injunctions and other proceedings issued
prior to removal “remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified
by the district court.”42 Also, attachments or sequestrations of goods or the
estate of a defendant in the state court are held to “answer the final judgment
or decree” of the district court in the “same manner they would have been
held to . . . had it been rendered by the State court.”43
Plaintiffs must satisfy the procedural requirement of service of process
“[b]efore a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.”44 Removal to federal court does not waive a defendant’s right to
object to the sufficiency of service and/or process,45 but sufficient and
complete service of process is necessary for the federal court to obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.46 Without personal jurisdiction
over the parties and without proper subject matter jurisdiction, the federal
court cannot issue a valid order that is binding on the parties.47
Service of process is defined as “a formal delivery of documents that is
legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action.”48
Federal process under Rule 4 includes a summons and copy of the
complaint,49 but state court requirements can differ.50 The “core function”
of service of process is to “supply notice” of a legal action in such a way that
affords the defendant a “fair opportunity to answer the complaint and present
defenses and objections.”51 The FRCP also contain a strong, general policy
favoring adjudication on the merits over dismissal based on “mere

41. Id. § 1447(a).
42. Id. § 1450.
43. Id.
44. Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 409 (1929); City of
Clarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 428 F.3d 206, 214 n.15 (5th Cir. 2005); Cantor
Fitzgerald, L.P., v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Removal does not waive
any Rule 12(b) defenses.”).
46. See Omni Cap., 484 U.S. at 104.
47. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982) (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1938)).
48. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)–(c)(1). Even when service of the summons is waived, a copy of
the complaint must be furnished on the defendant with the notice and request of waiver. Id.
4(d)(1)(C).
50. See generally Michael Hartman, Civil Justice: Service of Process, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/civil-justice-service-of-process637480363.aspx
[https://perma.cc/54JN-JW3P]
(collecting relevant statutes from all fifty states on the required contents of a summons, how
to serve the summons, whether to include the complaint when serving, and the timeline for
service). The individual state requirements for the contents of a summons are beyond the
scope of, and are not pertinent to, this Note.
51. Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996) (analyzing the purpose of
service of process and the “uniform system” of Rule 4 to hold that Rule 4 supplanted a federal
statute); see also Poole v. Amrit, No. 17-CV-05511, 2018 WL 6380792, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
6, 2018) (analyzing service of process under Henderson and § 1448).
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technicalities,”52 which explains why federal courts are generally less rigid
about enforcing strict service rules when actual notice was effectuated in a
reasonable manner.53
Defendants can contest the sufficiency of service by moving to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(5) and can contest the sufficiency of process under FRCP
12(b)(4) (“Rule 12(b)(4)”).54 Defendants will also often move to dismiss
under FRCP 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction by arguing that
incomplete service precludes the court from exercising personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.55 After the defendant files a motion to dismiss, the
burden is shifted to the serving party to prove the validity or sufficiency of
service and/or process.56
If a defendant decides to remove the case before being served or if
problems arise with service after removal, the procedure for completion or
perfection of service is covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1448. Section 1448 provides
in relevant part:
In all cases removed from any State court to any district court of the
United States in which any one or more of the defendants has not been
served with process or in which the service has not been perfected prior to
removal, or in which process served proves to be defective, such process or
service may be completed or new process issued in the same manner as in
cases originally filed in such district court. 57

After a case is removed to federal court, the FRCP apply,58 but the
sufficiency of service of process prior to removal is controlled by the
applicable state law.59 The requirements for service of process are detailed
52. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181–82 (1962); see also Baumeister v. N.M. Comm’n
for the Blind, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1353–54 (D.N.M. 2006) (applying the “strong policy”
from Foman to “the interplay” of § 1448 and the FRCP).
53. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462 n.1 (1965).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4)–(5); see also 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1353 (4th ed. 2021) (outlining the differences
between a motion under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)). Defendants often confuse the two types
of motions or move under both provisions of the rule. See id.
55. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, § 1353 (describing the difference between
a Rule 12(b)(5) and a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, and distinguishing between “interrelated” issues
of personal jurisdiction and service of process); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
56. E.g., Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 2005) (establishing
plaintiff’s burden when responding to a Rule 12(b)(5) motion); Scott v. Md. State Dep’t of
Labor, 673 F. App’x 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2016) (same); Henderson v. Texas, 672 F. App’x 383,
384 (5th Cir. 2016) (establishing plaintiff’s burden when responding to a motion to dismiss
under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1448.
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1) (“These rules apply to a civil action after it is removed from
a state court.”); see, e.g., Whidbee v. Pierce Cnty., 857 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2017) (using
FRCP 81(c)(1) to support use of Rule 4 procedure for service of process in removed case); see
also infra Part II.B.4 and II.C.4. The 1937 adoption of Rule 81 made statutes dealing with the
removal of actions, including the former version of § 1448, subject to Rule 4 procedure for
service of process. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c) advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption.
59. Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 616 n.8 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring that, when
determining whether process was properly served, “a federal court must apply the law of the
state under which the service was made”); accord Wallace v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F.3d 703,
707 (10th Cir. 2010); Whidbee, 857 F.3d at 1023.
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in Rule 4.60 Rules 4(a)–(c) describe what must be contained within the
federal process.61 Rule 4 describes how that process may be served: either
by following “state law for serving a summons” within the state where the
district court is located or service is made, or by delivering the process to the
defendant, a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant’s dwelling,
or an authorized agent of the defendant.62 Rule 4(m) requires that defendants
be served within ninety days of the complaint being filed, or the action will
be dismissed.63 A court “must extend the time for service” if the plaintiff
demonstrates good cause for failing to serve within the ninety-day period.64
The requirements of a good cause showing differ based on jurisdiction.65
Good cause generally includes a “diligent” but failed effort to serve the
defendant.66 Diligent but failed efforts include confusion over service
statutes,67 a reasonable belief that service had been appropriately
accomplished,68 or defendant’s evasion of service.69 Plaintiff has the burden
of establishing good cause.70
C. Legislative History of § 1448
28 U.S.C. § 1448 stemmed from a simple purpose.
The U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary for the 66th Congress
recommended a bill “providing for service of process in causes removed from
a State court to a United States court” for congressional approval in
November 1919.71 The committee relied on Professor W.S. Simkins’s book
A Federal Equity Suit, which described the problem to be remedied: at the
time, federal courts had no power to issue process or perfect service after
removal from state court.72 This forced federal courts to dismiss cases where
defendants were incompletely or defectively served prior to removal,
“because if the State court had no jurisdiction[, the federal court] cannot take
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
61. Id. 4(a)–(c).
62. Id. 4(e)(1), 4(g), 4(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
63. Id. 4(m) (emphasis added).
64. Id. (emphasis added). Courts are also authorized to “relieve a plaintiff of the
consequences of an application of this subdivision even if there is no good cause shown.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 4(m) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see also Henderson v. United
States, 517 U.S. 654, 662–63 (1996) (upholding courts’ discretion to extend the time to serve,
pursuant to the 1993 advisory committee’s note).
65. See, e.g., Schmude v. Sheahan, 214 F.R.D. 487, 490 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Seesing v.
Miller, No. 21-CV-26, 2021 WL 3410041, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2021). See generally 5B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, § 1137 n.6 (collecting cases that have found a showing of
good cause).
66. 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, § 1137.
67. E.g., Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 516–17 (3d Cir. 1988).
68. E.g., Genz-Ryan Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 10, 207 F.
Supp. 3d 1038, 1046 (D. Minn. 2016).
69. E.g., Hendry v. Schneider, 116 F.3d 446, 449 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997).
70. 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, § 1137.
71. H.R. REP. NO. 66-452, at 1 (1919).
72. W.S. SIMKINS, A FEDERAL EQUITY SUIT 860 (2d ed. 1911). The Committee Report
mistakenly refers to the author as “Simpkins,” see H.R. REP. NO. 66-452, at 1, but the accurate
spelling is “Simkins.”
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any.”73 The committee found Simkin’s description persuasive and
recommended that completion of service be permitted in federal courts to
“avoid the necessity of dismissing, paying the costs, and refiling.”74 The
committee was particularly concerned with the increased cost to litigants
when service could not be completed or perfected in federal court, resulting
in the “useless expense” of multiple court filings and prolonged litigation.75
The committee also wanted to ensure that the proposed act would not
enhance the federal courts’ jurisdiction in any way.76
The bill was submitted with “no objection” from the U.S. Department of
Justice, carrying with it a letter of approval from then Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer.77 The U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary also
recommended the bill to pass without amendment, quoting from the House
Committee on the Judiciary’s report in full to support its recommendation.78
The bill was passed in April 1920.79 The original language of the act
differs from its current version, providing for completion or perfection of
service when “any one or more of the defendants has not been served with
process or in which the same has not been perfected prior to such removal,”
or when “process . . . served proves to be defective.”80 Notably, the act as it
stood in 1920 contained a modifier stating that service may be perfected “in
the same manner as in cases which are originally filed in such United States
court.”81
This modifier is similar to the language in § 1448 as it stands today.82 The
current version of § 1448 was enacted in June 1948, when Congress codified
the Judicial Code.83 The amendments were characterized as changes “in
phraseology,” and Congress did not provide further explanation.84 However,
the language as amended differs significantly.85 Most notably, the 1920
version provides that when a defendant has not been served before removal,
when service has not been perfected prior to removal, or when service prior
to removal is defective, such process may be
completed by the United States court through its officers, or new process
as to defendants upon whom process has not been completed may be issued
73. SIMKINS, supra note 72, at 860.
74. H.R. REP. NO. 66-452, at 1.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2.
78. S. REP. NO. 66-453, at 1 (1920).
79. Act of April 16, 1920, ch. 146, 41 Stat. 554 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1448).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (providing that “process or service may be completed or new
process issued in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court” (emphasis
added)).
83. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A137 (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, at A132 (1946)
(providing no rationale for the phraseology change to § 1448).
85. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1448, with Act of April 16, 1920, ch. 146, 41 Stat. 554 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1448).
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out of such United States court, or service may be perfected in such court
in the same manner as in cases which are originally filed in such United
States court.86

The 1948 amendment shortened § 1448 into the version that exists today:
the modern § 1448 allows incomplete, unperfected, or defective service to be
“completed or new process issued in the same manner as in cases originally
filed in such district court.”87 Although each clause in the 1920 version was
given a modifier, the clauses in the current version were not: either (1) the
two remedies—issuance of new federal process or completion of state court
service of process—are both meant to be modified by the last clause; or (2)
only the last remedy is meant to be modified, and therefore only new process
issued must be executed pursuant to federal procedure and state court process
retains its efficacy after removal. These changes in wording may not appear
to majorly impact the statute’s substance, but the meaning of the statute
hinges on the tools and canons of statutory interpretation used—even
changes in phraseology can change its meaning. Part I.D. will explain how
these canons and tools have been used by the district courts to interpret
statutes.
D. Statutory Interpretation and the District Courts
Statutory interpretation at the district court level differs greatly from court
to court.88 District courts generally use interpretive methods and canons less
often89—and often conduct different interpretive analyses—than would
appellate courts.90 This is partly due to institutional constraints: district
courts hear many more cases, most of which deal with more complicated
issues of fact than of law, and district court judges rely on in-circuit authority
more than interpretive methods when resolving complex issues of law.91
However, district courts still use many classic canons of interpretation
when faced with interpretive issues.92 These methods of interpretation

86. Act of April 16, 1920, ch. 146.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1448. “United States court” in the 1920 version was changed to “district
court” in the current version because only the district courts possess jurisdiction over removed
cases after the amendments. H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, at A132.
88. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg:
Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1,
14–22 (2018).
89. See id. at 64–65.
90. See id. at 67–68 (describing the findings of a “matched-corpus” study, where the
author found that the canons used in the trial and appellate opinions for the same case were
usually different).
91. See id. at 14–20; James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Two Roads Diverged:
Statutory Interpretation by the Circuit Courts and Supreme Court in the Same Cases, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 834 (2019); Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd &
Andrew D. Martin, How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 83, 89 (2009).
92. See Bruhl, supra note 88, at 59 fig.6, 60 fig.7.
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include linguistic canons, such as the rule of the last antecedent,93 and textual
tools, such as the presumption of consistent usage.94
This Note will focus on the rule of the last antecedent,95 the presumption
of a disjunctive “or,”96 and the rule against surplusage.97 These tools of
statutory construction have been used by district courts before98 and have
been used both implicitly and explicitly by district courts when analyzing
§ 1448. Courts have reached different conclusions on whether § 1448
authorizes completion of state service of process after removal depending on
which statutory methodology, canon, or tool of interpretation they invoked.99
These interpretations have had different consequences for plaintiffs at the
pre-answer motion or responsive pleading stages,100 depending on when the
defendant raised the insufficient service and/or process defense, which
defendants often do before the plaintiff’s case has been heard on the merits.

93. See Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016) (“[W]hen a modifier appears
at the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to the item directly before it.”). The
rule of the last antecedent may be overcome when other “indicia of meaning” suggest so. Id.
at 352; see, e.g., N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2021)
(suggesting that the rule of the last antecedent should not be applied when the result would
require accepting an unlikely premise); cf. Grecian Magnesite Mining, Indus. & Shipping Co.
v. Comm’r, 926 F.3d 819, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that when other indicia of meaning
“all point in the same direction,” the rule of the last antecedent should be followed).
94. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“It is a
‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting Davis v.
Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989))). Textual canons and tools have become
more popular following the trickle-down adoption of textualism. Bruhl, supra note 88, at 58.
95. See cases cited supra note 93.
96. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018) (noting that
when “or” connects nouns and gerunds in a statute, it is “almost always disjunctive” (quoting
United States v. Wood, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013))). The meaning of “or” within a statute
generally indicates alternatives which should be treated separately. Rine v. Imagintas, Inc.,
590 F.3d 1215, 1224 (11th Cir. 2009); accord United States v. Nishiie, 996 F.3d 1013, 1023
(9th Cir. 2021); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1349 (10th Cir.
1987).
97. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“‘It is our duty to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’ We are thus ‘reluctan[t] to treat statutory
terms as surplusage’ in any setting.” (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955); and then quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
Cmtys. for Great Ore, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995))).
98. See cases cited supra notes 93, 96 and accompanying text. For instances of district
courts using the presumption of a disjunctive “or,” see, for example, Villafranco v. Pompeo,
486 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1082 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (noting that the use of “or” in a statute was
disjunctive); Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Devlin, 323 F. Supp. 3d 207, 213 (D. Mass. 2018)
(same); United States ex rel. Takemoto v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 273,
279 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).
99. See infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2.
100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, § 1347.
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II. A PATH OF ANALYTICAL FOOTSTEPS: THE PROGENY OF BEECHER V.
WALLACE AND DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1448
Differing interpretations of § 1448 have split district courts and one circuit
court101 into two main camps.102 One group has read § 1448 as only allowing
service of process after removal to be completed or perfected through
compliance with federal procedure. The other group of courts has read
§ 1448 to allow for completion or perfection of state court service of process
after removal and does not require new process to be issued from federal
court.
Part II will examine the varying interpretations of § 1448, first describing
an opinion from the highest court to decide this issue, the Ninth Circuit, in
Beecher v. Wallace. Part II will then discuss the various district court
opinions which have accepted or rejected the Beecher decision, as well as
their reasons for doing so. Each side of the split regarding Beecher’s
interpretation of § 1448 considers issues of (1) federalism; (2) statutory
interpretation; (3) the degree of notice provided to the defendant through
service; and (4) the interplay between § 1448, the FRCP, and the Judicial
Code. Part II.B and II.C will explain the reasoning behind courts’
understanding of this issue through those lenses.
A. Beecher v. Wallace: The Starting Point
The “sole question” before the Ninth Circuit in Beecher v. Wallace was
whether “a state court summons issued but not served prior to removal . . . to
the federal courts retain[ed] any efficacy for further service of process after
the removal.”103 The Ninth Circuit is the highest court to address this issue,
and the Beecher opinion became the starting point for many courts within
and without the Ninth Circuit when dealing with the same question.104
To answer this question, the Beecher court conducted a “careful reading”
of § 1448.105 The careful reading used notions of federalism and the purpose
of service and implicitly invoked common tools of statutory interpretation to
reach its conclusion.106 The purpose of service of process, in the court’s
opinion, is to give the defendant “notice of the proceeding against him,”
making service of process an “indispensable prerequisite” to obtaining
jurisdiction over a party.107
Through its reading of § 1448, the court laid out its understanding of the
statutory provisions as applying to three possible situations: (1) where a
101. Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1967). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit cited Beecher when circling around the issue of § 1448’s interpretation but
ultimately decided “there [was] no need” to definitively rule one way or the other because the
issue of service was resolved on other grounds. Wallace v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F.3d 703,
707 (10th Cir. 2010).
102. See infra Appendix A.
103. 381 F.2d at 373.
104. See infra Parts II.B–C.
105. Beecher, 381 F.2d at 373.
106. See id.
107. Id.

2022]

SECOND SERVICE

179

defendant had not been served at all prior to removal, (2) where a defendant
had been served but service had not been perfected, and (3) where a
defendant was served but the process was defective.108
The court framed its interpretation of § 1448 by differentiating these
situations through the lenses of the purpose of service and concerns about
federalism.109 In the first situation, where the defendant had not been served
prior to removal, the state court never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant in the first place.110 But in the second two situations, where
service was unperfected or defective before removal, the defendant was put
on notice of the case against him, and the state court obtained jurisdiction
over him.111
The Beecher court thought that the last two situations would occur only in
very narrow circumstances.112 Primarily, the second situation, unperfected
service, could occur, for example, when the return was not filed in state court
prior to removal.113 There, the court read § 1448 as allowing the plaintiff to
complete service by filing the return in state court.114 The third situation,
defective process, could be cured by amendment, and thus could also be
completed in federal court without rendering the state court process void.115
The first situation, however, could not be remedied by completion of state
court service of process. The defendant was never put on notice of the
proceeding prior to removal, which rendered the state court process void after
removal.116 The only remedy available when the defendant had not been
served prior to removal was to issue new federal process under Rule 4.117
From this understanding of § 1448’s scope, the court held that state court
process issued but not served prior to removal did not “retain any efficacy”
after removal.118 To complete sufficient service, the Beecher court held that
the plaintiff must obtain and serve new federal process on the defendant.119
Beecher’s interpretation of § 1448 is foundational for courts that both
agree and disagree with its holding, and is at the core of many defendants’
Rule 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) motions to dismiss.120 The Ninth Circuit
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Here, the court was referring to filing a proof of mailing or personal delivery of
process through an affidavit by the serving party. For an example of a required “return” to
complete service, see Velten v. Daughtrey, 226 F. Supp. 91, 92 (W.D. Mo. 1964), which was
cited in Beecher. See Beecher, 381 F.2d at 373.
114. Beecher, 381 F.2d at 373.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Protos Shipping, 472 F. Supp. 979, 982
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (“Relying on Beecher v. Wallace, defendants contend that . . . the service of
the state process upon them subsequent to removal did not subject them to the jurisdiction of
[the federal court].” (citation omitted)); Tanus Cabinets Designs, Inc. v. Cent. Transp. LLC,
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provided succinct reasoning behind its interpretation of § 1448, but the court
was clear in its delineation of § 1448’s scope and available remedies.
The court seemed to view the use of “or” within the statute as covering
three distinct situations, consistent with the presumption of a disjunctive
“or.”121 Accordingly, it assigned the two remedies available under the statute
—completion of state court process or new federal process issued—to each
situation differently by stating that § 1448 “recognizes this distinction.”122
The court distinguished between the two remedies based on jurisdictional
concerns: when a defendant is put on notice of the proceeding and came
within the jurisdiction of the state court before removal, the state court
process retains efficacy after removal.123 However, when a defendant is not
served with process before removal, they were not put on notice of the
pending action nor did they come within the jurisdiction of the state court
before removal, and thus the state court process is void after removal.124 The
court’s careful balancing between state and federal jurisdiction prioritizes
state court jurisdiction above federal jurisdiction, echoing the 66th
Congress’s concerns125 when it enacted § 1448’s predecessor by affirming
that the federal court cannot obtain jurisdiction when the state court has not
first acquired it.
The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly overturned Beecher, but it has
subsequently called its decision into question. The plaintiff in Richards v.
Harper126 argued that § 1448 authorized completion of state court service of
process after removal, and while the court resolved the issue of service on
other grounds, the Ninth Circuit posited that the Richards plaintiff may have
been correct.127 Courts that have rejected Beecher’s holding cite Richards
as evidence that Beecher should no longer be followed.128 But despite the
Ninth Circuit’s suggestion in Richards, Part II.B explains that many courts
have found the reasoning and holding in Beecher to be persuasive and have
thus adopted it in their districts.
B. After Removal, Only Federal Process Can Be Served: Subsequent
Adoption of Beecher
Many courts following Beecher adopted its holding that state court process
does not retain its efficacy after removal. They have also adopted its
No. 14-CV-00059, 2014 WL 2863139, at *2 (D. Nev. June 24, 2014) (describing defendant’s
motion to dismiss, where defendant relied on Beecher to argue that plaintiff had to serve
process in accordance with the FRCP).
121. See cases cited supra note 96.
122. Beecher, 381 F.3d at 373.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See supra text accompanying note 76.
126. 864 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1988).
127. Id. at 87 (noting that “[a]lthough § 1448 appears to support” the plaintiff’s argument
that the district court had the power to allow completion of the state court service, the Ninth
Circuit’s “precedent holds otherwise”).
128. See, e.g., Queen v. Schmidt, No. 10-2017, 2015 WL 5175712, at *12 n.10 (D.D.C.
Sept. 3, 2015); Minter v. Showcase Sys., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 597, 601 n.4 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
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reasoning: only federal process would be allowed because (1) the state
court’s jurisdiction must be respected and balanced against the federal court’s
jurisdiction, (2) the plain text of § 1448 compels such an interpretation,
(3) state court process cannot provide effective and complete notice to the
defendant, and (4) federal law and procedure are prioritized after removal.
1. Federalist Concerns
Courts that have followed Beecher’s interpretation display a similar
concern about balancing jurisdiction between federal and state courts. At the
forefront of concerns about balancing jurisdiction is ensuring that the state
court acquired jurisdiction prior to removal—if the state court did not acquire
jurisdiction, the federal court has no jurisdiction to take.129 This can be true
even when contemplating the validity of state court process, as was the case
in DiCesare-Engler Productions, Inc. v. Mainman Ltd.130
After the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to serve one defendant prior to
removal, the DiCesare court found that there was no service to complete
when the state court did not first acquire jurisdiction over the incompletely
served defendant.131 There, the court held that new process must be issued
under Rule 4 before the case could continue on its merits.132 The DiCesare
court contemplated that “process in an action removed from state court
[could] be authorized under [§ 1448],” but when service was unperfected at
the time of removal, the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the
defendant.133
Ensuring that the state court first acquires jurisdiction prior to removal is
a requirement that arises in part from Beecher’s assertion that state court
process is “null and void” after removal when the defendant was not fully
served prior to removal.134 In Alexander Technologies, Inc. v. International
Frontier Forwarders, Inc.,135 the court found that service of state court
process on the defendants was “ineffective to bring [the defendants] within
the jurisdiction of” the federal court when served after removal, relying in
part on the Beecher court’s assertion.136 Consequently, the Alexander
Technologies court denied the plaintiff’s request for entry of default on that
basis.137
The federal court in Codrington v. Arch Specialty Insurance Co.138
addressed the question of whether the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint,
which was filed in state court and served on the defendants prior to removal,
129. See supra text accompanying note 76.
130. 421 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
131. Id. at 121.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1967).
135. No. H-05-2598, 2006 WL 3694517 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2006).
136. Id. at *1 (quoting Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1962); and then citing
Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1967)).
137. Id. (citing Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1967).
138. No. 19-CV-00026, 2019 WL 3554698 (D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2019).
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had become operative.139 As of the date of removal, the state court had not
ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint, but had served a
summons and copy of the second amended complaint on the defendants.140
After the case was removed to federal court, however, that court relied on
Beecher and found that the state court process was null and void because
“exclusive jurisdiction of [that] action became vested” in the federal court
following removal.141 The court thus quashed plaintiffs’ prior service and
ordered plaintiffs to re-serve defendants with new, federal summonses.142
Beecher espouses an all-or-nothing view of state and federal court
jurisdiction: where one has jurisdiction, the other must not. For instance, in
Dean Marketing, Inc. v. AOC International (U.S.A.) Ltd.,143 the court held
that “[a]fter removal of the action to [federal] Court, the state court no longer
had jurisdiction of the matter.”144 This view meant that the Dean Marketing
plaintiff’s service of state court process after removal was ineffective, as all
service after removal “must be accomplished according to federal
procedure”145 and only federal procedure.
2. Statutory Interpretation of § 1448
The Beecher court asserted that its decision arose from a “careful reading”
of the statute.146 Each court, however, interprets § 1448 in a subtly different
way, and courts that have adopted Beecher’s holding have not delved into
§ 1448’s statutory language as thoroughly as courts that have rejected
Beecher.147 Courts that have adopted Beecher’s holding focus more on
insufficient notice provided by state court process or compliance with the
FRCP.148
At least one court, however, has analyzed the plain language of § 1448.
The court in Bruley v. Lincoln Property Co.149 acknowledged that allowing
completion of state court service of process after removal was a “plausible”
reading of § 1448, but reasoned that it was “plain that the phrase ‘in the same
manner . . .’ was meant to modify both the completion of service and
issuance of new process,”150 meaning that service may only be completed
“in conformity with the federal rules.”151 The Bruley court quashed the
plaintiff’s service and ordered the plaintiff to re-serve the defendant in
conformity with Rule 4.152
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
610 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
Id. at 151 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446).
Id. at 152.
Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1967).
See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Parts II.B.3–4.
140 F.R.D. 452 (D. Colo. 1991).
Id. at 454 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1448).
Id.
Id. at 455.
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Bruley implicitly rejected the rule of the last antecedent153 in its
interpretation of § 1448. The rule of the last antecedent can be overcome
when the meaning of the statute compels it.154 Indeed, the Bruley court
thought that the construction of § 1448 indicated that the modifier “in the
same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court” was meant to
apply both to completion of service and new process issued.155 In addition
to providing this interpretation of the plain text of § 1448, the Bruley court
found that the state court process provided insufficient notice and therefore
mandated the use of new, federal process after removal.156 Other courts have
found state court process to be similarly deficient in providing notice to
defendants.157
3. Providing Notice to Defendants
Subsequent courts have also considered notice to the defendants to be a
major factor when interpreting § 1448. Courts are split over whether state
court service of process can provide the defendant with sufficient notice.
When courts see the purpose of service frustrated and find that the defendant
was not put on sufficient notice, they are more likely to agree with Beecher.
The court in Bruley quashed the plaintiff’s service of process based on its
interpretation of § 1448’s text, but the court’s holding was bolstered by other
factors, including the “fundamental” purpose of Rule 4 service as providing
actual notice to defendants.158 The Bruley court reasoned that state court
process could not retain efficacy after removal because “mere service of a
state court summons” did not put the defendant on notice that the action is
pending in federal court.159 Partially because the Bruley plaintiff made no
effort to notify the defendant that the case had been removed, the Bruley court
held that the service must be quashed.160
The court in Alexander Technologies considered both concerns of
overreaching federal jurisdiction and whether the defendant was put on
sufficient notice. The court found Beecher’s consideration of adequate
notice to the defendant persuasive and adopted Beecher’s holding that a
federal court cannot complete state court service of process “where the
defendant has never been put on notice of the state court proceeding prior to

153. See supra note 93.
154. See supra note 93.
155. See Bruley, 140 F.R.D. at 454.
156. Id.
157. See infra Part II.B.3.
158. Bruley, 140 F.R.D. at 454.
159. Id. (citing Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685,
688 (9th Cir. 1988)).
160. Id.
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removal.”161 The court then dismissed the plaintiff’s request for entry of
default partially on these grounds.162
However, notice can be seen as the trump card in service of process
issues—if the defendant had sufficient notice, then the Rule 4 standard can
be “liberally construed” to accommodate any technical deficiencies.163 The
court in Ketchmark v. Brown-Williamson Tobacco Corp.164 found that the
plaintiff’s service of process was deficient under state and federal law,165 and
that these deficiencies were not “merely technical” such that Rule 4 could
accommodate the service under a flexible standard if the defendant had
sufficient notice.166 Notably, the Ketchmark defendant moved to dismiss the
service of process for failure to comply with state law, but the Ketchmark
court was clear that federal law governed the service after removal.167 The
court cited Beecher and the text of § 1448 without discussing the split over
interpretation, but emphasized that the deficiencies in the plaintiff’s service
were analyzed primarily under the FRCP.168
4. Applicability of the Federal Rules After Removal
Many courts that have subsequently adopted the holding in Beecher also
do so in part because the FRCP establish their sole applicability after removal
through FRCP 81(c)(1) (“Rule 81(c)(1)”).169 Rule 81(c)(1) has been used as
support for mandating the use of federal procedure after removal.
The court in Bruley based its holding on its interpretation of § 1448’s
language,170 but the court also found support in the “well-settled rule” that
federal procedure governs after removal.171 The Bruley court found that
interpreting § 1448 to allow completion of state court service of process

161. Alexander Techs. v. Int’l Frontier Forwarders, Inc., No. H-05-2598, 2006 WL
3694517, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2006) (citing Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372, 373 (9th
Cir. 1967)).
162. Id.
163. Ketchmark v. Brown-Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 18-00079, 2018 WL 3451450,
at *2 (D. Haw. July 17, 2018) (quoting Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Techs.,
Inc, 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988)); id. at *5 n.8 (citing United Food & Com. Workers
Union, Local 197 v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Ketchmark
plaintiff appeared pro se, meaning that the court had to liberally construe the plaintiff’s filings
regardless, but the court considered the requirement of Rule 4 flexibility independently of the
plaintiff’s pro se status. Compare id. at *1 n.2 (“Because Ketchmark is appearing pro se, the
Court liberally construes his filings.”), with id. at *2 (explaining that “Rule 4 is a flexible rule
that should be liberally construed to uphold service” if the defendant received sufficient
notice), and id. at *5 n.8 (finding that the plaintiff’s filings did not comply with Rule 4 even
under a liberal construction of the Rule 4 standard).
164. No. 18-00079, 2018 WL 3451450 (D. Haw. July 17, 2018).
165. See id. at *3, *5.
166. Id.
167. See id. at *3, *4 n.7.
168. See id.
169. See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
170. See Bruley v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 140 F.R.D. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1991); see also supra
text accompanying notes 149–52.
171. Bruley, 140 F.R.D. at 454 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)).
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would give no effect to Rule 81(c)(1).172 Therefore, only federal service of
process pursuant to Rule 4 was allowed after removal.173
The court in Cowen v. American Medical Systems, Inc.174 found the
plaintiff’s original state court service of process to be defective under state
law and ordered the plaintiff to re-serve the defendants using a federal
summons.175 The court found that the service had to be perfected using
federal process because “after an action is removed, federal law governs,”
and the procedure for correcting defects after removal is set forth in the
FRCP.176 The court cited Rule 81(c) in support of this finding and ordered
the plaintiff to follow Rule 4 procedures to re-serve the defendants.177
The magistrate judge in Amtrust North America v. Sennebogen
Maschinenfabrik GmbH178 did not resolve the sufficiency of state court
service of process after removal because the complaint was dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction, but the judge indicated that only federal service
of process is acceptable after removal.179 The court cited § 1448 and Rule
81(c)(1) as comprehensive proof that only federal procedure may be used
after removal.180
In addition to Rule 81(c)(1), courts have found neighboring sections of the
Judicial Code to be persuasive when mandating the use of federal procedure
after removal. For example, the court in Dean Marketing cited 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446 in support of the finding that, after removal, “the state court no longer
had jurisdiction of the matter.”181 Additionally, the Cowen court cited 28
U.S.C. § 1447(a) in support of its order that defendants be re-served.182 In
its opinion, the court quoted from § 1447(a) to state that the court was
authorized to issue “all necessary orders” to bring the proper parties before
it, whether the parties are served with state court process or not.183 The
Cowen court found that ordering the plaintiff to re-serve the defendant
pursuant to Rule 4 was necessary to bring the defendant before the court.184

172. See id.
173. See id.
174. 411 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
175. Id. at 720–21.
176. Id. at 720 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)).
177. Id. at 721.
178. No. 19-CV-1004, 2020 WL 5441407 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-1004, 2020 WL 5423203 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2020).
179. See id. at *11 n.10 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1448; and then citing FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1)).
180. See id.
181. Dean Mktg., Inc. v. AOC Int’l (U.S.A.) Ltd., 610 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446). The Dean Marketing court appears to be referencing the current
version of § 1446(d), which halts all proceedings in the state court after the removal “unless
and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). When Dean Marketing was decided in
1985, similar language was contained in § 1446(e). See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No.
80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 939 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446) (stating that, after removal,
“the State court shall proceed no further therein unless the case is remanded”).
182. See Cowen v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 717, 720–21 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
183. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a)).
184. See id.
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C. State Court Process May Be Served After Removal: Subsequent
Rejection of Beecher
Courts that have followed and adopted Beecher’s holding have done so
because of concerns regarding the balance of federal and state jurisdiction,
sufficient notice owed to defendants, and because of the plain language of
§ 1448, neighboring sections of the Judicial Code, and the FRCP. Similar
themes underscore the opinions of courts that have rejected Beecher’s
holding, and those courts have found the flip side of the coin to be more
persuasive when supporting their departure from Beecher. Many, possibly a
majority,185 of those court opinions have rejected Beecher’s holding and
allowed state court service of process to be completed after removal.
1. Absence of Concerns About Federalism
Subsequent courts that have disagreed with Beecher do not often bring
concerns of federalism into their interpretations of § 1448. For example, the
court in Minter v. Showcase Systems, Inc.186 cited to many of the cases
adopting Beecher and acknowledged their jurisdictional concerns;187
however, when rejecting the Beecher decision, the Minter court did not cede
to concerns about federalism.188 The court in Spiritbank v. McCarty189 also
acknowledged Beecher’s jurisdictional reasoning—that jurisdiction lies
solely with the federal court after removal—but did not cede to concerns
about federalism in its decision.190 Instead of balancing federal and state
jurisdiction, courts that have permitted completion of service of state court
process after removal ground their reasoning more often in dissections of the
plain language of § 1448 using the tools of statutory interpretation.

185. See Spiritbank v. McCarty, No. 08-CV-675, 2009 WL 1158747, at *2 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 22, 2009) (collecting cases and concluding that “the majority view appears to favor”
allowing state court service of process to be completed); accord Queen v. Schmidt, No.
10-2017, 2015 WL 5175712, at *12 n.10 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2015) (concluding that “perhaps a
greater number” of courts have rejected Beecher); Oscar Ubaldo Garcia, Inc. v. Allied Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-00243, 2017 WL 11221429, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017)
(“[M]any courts, if not the majority of courts, have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Beecher . . . .” (citing Queen v. Schmidt, No. 10-2017, 2015 WL 5175712, at *12 n.10 (D.D.C.
Sept. 3, 2015))). These courts appear to be referencing only the courts that have explicitly
acknowledged the split in authority on § 1448, but in actuality, there are perhaps more courts
that favor requiring new process issued under Rule 4 after removal by taking Beecher’s
holding for granted and avoiding the open question of § 1448’s interpretation entirely.
Compare infra Appendix A, with infra Appendix B.
186. 641 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
187. See id. at 599–600 (collecting cases that have adopted Beecher and quoting their
reasoning, including their concerns about overreaching federal jurisdiction).
188. Id. at 600–02.
189. No. 08-CV-675, 2009 WL 1158747 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 22, 2009).
190. Compare id. at *2 (“[T]he [Beecher] court held that following removal, jurisdiction
lies solely with the federal district court.”), with id. (holding that § 1448 permits “completion
of state procedure for service”).
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2. Statutory Interpretation of § 1448
Courts that have rejected Beecher’s approach have grounded their analysis
in § 1448’s plain text and the canons of statutory interpretation. The court in
Orner v. International Laboratories, Inc.191 dismissed the defendant’s
motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) after
the plaintiff made repeated attempts and ultimately served the defendant with
the state court writ of summons.192 As is typical with cases involving the
§ 1448 split, the defendant moved to dismiss by arguing that the service did
not comply with federal law.193
The Orner court acknowledged the split in authority over whether state
court process could be served after removal and collected many of the
aforementioned cases.194 However, the court grounded its decision in the
“text of § 1448.”195 The Orner court read the phrase “may be completed or
new process issued in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such
district court”196 as providing two distinct options to plaintiffs after
removal—either serving new federal process or completing state court
process.197
The Orner court cited the rule against surplusage to reach this conclusion:
to read the statute as requiring federal service of process in all cases after
removal was to give “no effect” to the word “completed” in the statute.198
The court then turned to the use of “or” within § 1448, invoking the
presumption of a disjunctive “or.”199 The court found that the use of “or” in
§ 1448 clearly provides two options to plaintiffs after removal because the
use of “or” in a statute “is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it
connects are to be given separate meanings.”200 Therefore, the Orner court
found that § 1448 allows completion of state court service of process or
serving new federal process.201 Given that the Orner plaintiff’s service fell
squarely within service contemplated by § 1448, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss for insufficient service of process was denied.202

191. No. 20-CV-00449, 2020 WL 6710277 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2020).
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id.
194. See id. at *5.
195. Id.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1448.
197. Orner, 2020 WL 6710277, at *5.
198. Id. The court cited Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), for its definition of
the rule against surplusage and interpreted the statute in question in that case to “give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Orner, 2020 WL 6710277, at *5 (quoting
United States v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2020)).
199. Orner, 2020 WL 6710277, at *5.
200. Id. (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013)).
201. Id.
202. Id. The defendant in Orner moved to certify the issue of sufficient service for
appellate review, but the district court denied the motion. Orner v. Int’l Lab’ys Inc., No.
20-CV-00449, 2020 WL 9749413, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2020). The Orner court thought
that even if the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed its analysis of § 1448, the
plaintiff’s understanding of § 1448 authorizing use of state court process for service after
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Orner is seemingly the only case to explicitly use rules and canons of
statutory interpretation to parse meaning from § 1448, but the Orner court
reached the same conclusion as courts that have invoked the rules of statutory
interpretation only implicitly. One of the earliest cases to reject Beecher,
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Protos Shipping, Inc.,203
condemned Beecher’s interpretation of § 1448 for “improperly deif[ying]
form over substance.”204 That court rejected Beecher explicitly, calling the
decision “incorrect as a matter of law.”205 There, the court interpreted the
wording of § 1448 to allow completion of state court process after
removal.206 According to the Protos Shipping court, the Beecher court
prioritized the form of service and ignored its “substance,” which was the
fact that the defendants were put on full notice by the service.207
By purporting to give meaning to the “explicit wording” of the statute, the
Protos Shipping court assumed that the text of the statute makes its meaning
obvious.208 The reasoning in Protos Shipping thus serves as a jumping off
point for other courts intending to depart from Beecher. Those courts,
however, offer more textual support for their departure.
Indeed, the court in Listle v. Milwaukee County209 cited Protos Shipping
when rejecting Beecher.210 The Listle court agreed with the Protos Shipping
court that the decision in Beecher “improperly elevate[d] form over
substance” and gave weight to Protos Shipping’s interpretation of § 1448’s
“explicit language.”211 The court also went beyond the analysis in Protos
Shipping by explaining that Beecher’s interpretation of § 1448 “gives no
meaning to the phrase of the statute allowing ‘completion’ of unperfected or
defective process or service.”212 Further, the Listle court interpreted § 1448
as contemplating completion of service of process that had begun prior to
removal, which was inherently at odds with requiring issuance of new federal
process after removal.213
Implicit in the Listle court’s interpretation of § 1448 was the rule against
surplusage. By rejecting an interpretation that “gives no meaning” to one
removal was “reasonable” enough to constitute a showing of good cause, and, regardless, the
plaintiff should receive an extension on time to serve. Id. at *2; see also infra Part III.C.
203. 472 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
204. Id. at 982–83.
205. Id. at 983 n.3.
206. Id. at 982.
207. Id. at 982–83; see also infra Part II.C.3. The court cites to an old version of Rule 4—
the section referred to was amended in 1993 and moved to Rules 4(e)(1) and 4(h)(1)(A). See
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
208. See Protos Shipping, 472 F. Supp. at 982. Viewing § 1448’s meaning as obvious
based on its plain text is not a position uniquely held by the Protos Shipping court: the court
in Scott v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. viewed its interpretation of § 1448 as so apparent from
the statutory language that the only support it provided for this interpretation was the statute
itself. No. 06-CV-4057, 2007 WL 215804, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 25, 2007).
209. 926 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
210. Id. at 827.
211. Id. at 828.
212. Id. at 827.
213. Id.
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part of the statute, the court favored an interpretation that gives meaning to
each clause and word of § 1448.214 This interpretive move authorizes
completion of state court service of process after removal because it
expresses two distinct options within § 1448: completion of service of
process and issuance of new process. The Listle court’s interpretation
contrasts with textual analyses found in Beecher and Bruley, which interpret
the phrase “in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district
court” as affecting the whole statute, rendering issuance of federal process
the only option when service had not been perfected before removal.215
These textual analyses effectively overlook the rule against surplusage, a
move which the Listle court implicitly refuted.
The court in Schmude v. Sheahan216 agreed with the reasoning in Listle
and Protos Shipping and cited both cases to support its conclusion that § 1448
“allows for the completion of state service of process if the process was
commenced prior to the date of removal.”217 In Schmude, much like in Listle
and in Protos Shipping, the court interpreted § 1448 as providing two options
to plaintiffs after removal: service pursuant to Rule 4 or completion of state
service of process.218 The Schmude court reasoned that “interpreting § 1448
in any other way holds contrary to the explicit wording of the statute.”219
Thus, the court appears to agree that the meaning of the statute is obvious
from its language, and that both options must be given full expression in
order to properly construe the statutory meaning. 220 Giving expression to
both service options under § 1448 again implicitly follows the rule against
surplusage by refusing to render any part of § 1448’s text superfluous.
Meanwhile, the court in Spiritbank v. McCarty instead focused on
individual words within § 1448 to hold that state court service of process is
sufficient following removal. There, the court surveyed previous cases that
had discussed different interpretations of § 1448, including Beecher, Bruley,
Protos Shipping, Listle, and Schmude.221 The court agreed with the
reasoning in Protos Shipping, interpreting § 1448 to allow completion of
state court service of process.222 The Spiritbank court focused on the word
“completed,” reasoning that its inclusion “clearly indicates completion of
state procedure for service.”223 The Spiritbank court’s textualist reading of
§ 1448, which hinged on the meaning of the word “completed,” allowed the
court to reject Beecher’s interpretation.224 The court also apparently agreed
with an analysis of § 1448 based on the rule against surplusage by quoting

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 828.
See supra text accompanying notes 112–19, 149–55.
214 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
No. 08-CV-675, 2009 WL 1158747, at *1–2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 22, 2009).
Id. at *2.
Id.
See id.
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excerpts from Listle, which invoked the rule, in support of its finding that the
“the better view” was expressed in Listle and its progeny.225
Minter v. Showcase Systems, Inc.226 eventually became one of the more
widely cited cases supporting the authorization of service of state court
process after removal under § 1448.227 The Minter court provided a detailed
survey of the cases supporting and rejecting Beecher’s seminal interpretation
when describing its departure from Beecher.228 The court honed in on the
statutory language to support its conclusion and relied on logic similar to that
in the cases it cited: the court emphasized the use of the word “completed”
when referring to “such process or service,” therefore interpreting the final
clause of § 1448 as “clearly providing two alternatives.”229 Moreover, the
court reasoned against an interpretation that would only allow federal service
of process because such an interpretation would render “the phrase ‘may be
completed’ . . . meaningless.”230
The Minter court’s reading of the statute familiarly invoked the rule
against surplusage by focusing on expressing the full meaning of the phrase
“may be completed” and ensuring that all parts of the statute retained their
meaning.231 The court also read the phrase “may be completed or new
process issued” as providing two alternatives to plaintiffs after removal.232
As other courts have done, the Minter court grounded this interpretation in
an analysis of the word “completed” within the statutory language, but it also
analyzed the phrasing of “such process or service,” suggesting that the phrase
could only refer to state court process.233
The court in Queen v. Schmidt234 focused its “question of statutory
interpretation” on § 1448’s “key final clause: ‘such process or service may
be completed or new process issued.’”235 The Queen court, however, gave
weight to different words within that phrase than its predecessors did when
concluding that state court service of process retains its efficacy after
removal.236 Indeed, the Queen court familiarly found that § 1448 covers
three situations following removal,237 but also noted that these three
225. Id.
226. 641 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
227. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Kubota Corp., No. 11-CV-834, 2012 WL 13001791, at *1–2
(M.D. Ala. July 31, 2012); Queen v. Schmidt, No. 10-2017, 2015 WL 5175712, at *11–12
(D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2015); Oscar Ubaldo Garcia, Inc. v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No.
17-CV-00243, 2017 WL 11221429, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017); Orner v. Int’l Lab’ys,
Inc., No. 20-CV-00449, 2020 WL 6710277, at *4 n.3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2020); Southers v.
Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., No. 20-CR-126, 2021 WL 1250315, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Ky.
Apr. 5, 2021).
228. See Minter, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 601–02.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 602 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1448).
231. See id.
232. Id. at 601–02.
233. Id.
234. No. 10-2017, 2015 WL 5175712 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2015).
235. Id. at *11 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1448).
236. Id. at *11–12.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 108–17.
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situations are “separated by the word ‘or,’” and “followed by the provision
that ‘such process or service may be completed.’”238 The court held that,
because of the use of “or” followed by § 1448’s last clause, when a defendant
has not been served prior to removal, the plaintiff may complete the state
court service of process after removal even if there was no attempt at service
prior to removal.239 The Queen court implicitly invoked the rule of the
disjunctive “or” by viewing the two clauses in § 1448 as alternatives that
should be treated differently.240 Moreover, the Queen court questioned
Beecher’s three-situation framework by applying the clause “may be
completed or new process issued” to all parts of § 1448 equally, whereas the
Beecher court viewed the completion of state court service as only being
available in certain situations covered by § 1448.241
The interpretations of § 1448 in favor of completion of state court service
of process after removal have hinged on different words, phrases, or clauses
within the statute but have are largely supported by the statutory text. In
addition to careful readings of § 1448, courts that have either adopted or
rejected Beecher have all grounded their holdings in considerations of the
notice provided to the defendant.
3. Providing Notice to Defendants
When courts have found that the defendant had actual notice, they are more
likely to find that the defendant’s motion to dismiss or quash service was
unmeritorious and thereby approve completion of the state court service of
process after removal.
For example, the court in Protos Shipping rejected the holding in Beecher
for “improperly deif[ying] form over substance” partially because the
defendants had actual notice of the pending litigation through the state court
summons.242 Prior to removal, the state court service gave the defendants
actual notice because it contained the complaint,243 and, after removal, the
defendants received actual notice because the removing defendant served the
notice of removal on the second defendant, who had moved to dismiss.244
Similarly, the Listle court denied the defendant’s motion to quash
service245 partially because of its interpretation of § 1448, but also because
238. Queen, 2015 WL 5175712, at *11 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1448).
239. Id. at *11–12.
240. See id.; see also cases cited supra note 96.
241. Compare Queen, 2015 WL 5175712, at *11 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1448), with supra
text accompanying notes 108–17.
242. See Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Protos Shipping, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 979,
982–83 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Listle v. Milwaukee Cnty., 926 F. Supp. 826, 828 (E.D. Wis. 1996). The Listle
plaintiffs sued both Milwaukee County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board, but by the
time the county removed the case to federal court, only the county had been completely served.
Id. at 826–27. The plaintiffs served the pension board after removal with a state court
summons and complaint. Id. at 827. The pension board then moved to quash service because
it claimed that the state court process was insufficient after removal. Id.
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the court agreed with Protos Shipping that quashing the state court service
would “improperly elevate[] form over substance.”246 The Listle court, too,
found that the defendant who moved to quash service had “actual notice” of
the complaint through the state court service.247 Moreover, the court found
that that defendant was notified of the removal because both defendants,
including the defendant who originally removed the case to federal court,
were represented by the same counsel.248 In both Protos Shipping and Listle,
the courts found that state court service of process was sufficient to put the
defendants on actual notice of the pending action and of the case’s removal,
thereby addressing concerns espoused by courts that had found the notice
provided by state court process to be insufficient.249
Occasionally, plaintiffs have been required to re-serve the defendant out
of an abundance of caution resulting from contradictory interpretations of
§ 1448, but even in these cases, courts have been hesitant to dismiss the case
when the defendant had been given actual notice of the suit. For example,
the court in Howse v. Zimmer Manufacturing, Inc.250 dealt with the issue of
whether service of process was sufficient when the plaintiff amended the
complaint after removal to reassert jurisdiction under a different state
statute.251 The Howse court found that the original service was defective
once the plaintiff amended their complaint because § 1448 required federal
service when the service prior to removal was defective.252 However, the
court did not dismiss the complaint for insufficient service because the
defendants had received actual notice of the plaintiff’s action, as “[i]t serves
no useful purpose” to dismiss an action when it would just be “refiled and
re-served.”253 The court nevertheless required the plaintiff to re-serve the
defendant pursuant to Rule 4.254
Additionally, a magistrate judge in M.A. v. KFC Corp.255 addressed a split
of authority among the courts within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit regarding the interpretation of § 1448 by comparing the contradictory
holdings in Minter and Alexander Technologies. Although the magistrate
judge left the issue of whether state court process issued but not served prior
246. Id. at 828.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 116, 159–60.
250. 109 F.R.D. 628 (D. Mass. 1986).
251. Id. at 630. The plaintiff in Howse originally asserted jurisdiction over the defendant
pursuant to the Massachusetts long-arm statute but amended the complaint after removal to
assert jurisdiction under Massachusetts state law. Id. The reassertion of jurisdiction changed
the acceptable methods of service, as service by registered mail was not allowed under that
state law but was allowed under the long-arm statute. Id. at 631. The Howse court thus had to
decide whether the original service under the long-arm statute retained efficacy after the
plaintiff reasserted jurisdiction. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing William I. Horlick Co. v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F. Supp. 514, 515
(D. Mass. 1956)).
254. Id.
255. No. 17-CV-03114, 2018 WL 4233814 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-03114, 2018 WL 4232920 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2018).
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to removal retained efficacy after removal unresolved, the court denied the
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss because the defendants were
given actual notice of the action against them by state court service.256
However, because the issue had yet to be resolved by the Fifth Circuit, the
plaintiff was ordered to re-serve the defendants pursuant to Rule 4.257
Although the plaintiff in Cline v. North Central Life Insurance Co.258 was
not required to re-serve the defendant because their complaint was ultimately
dismissed on other grounds, the court suggested that “failure of service does
not compel dismissal” of a suit when the defendant could be re-served or
when it is apparent that the defendant received actual notice of the
complaint.259 The Cline court also found that § 1448 “would seem to allow
for completion after removal of service of state court process issued prior to
removal.”260 Partially because the defendant received actual notice of the
complaint by admitting to receiving the summons and complaint through
state court service of process, the court dismissed the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.261
4. Possible Reconciliation of State Court Service of Process with the
Requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
At least one court has attempted to reconcile Rule 81(c)(1) with § 1448 in
a way that would allow for completion of state court service of process.
In Carden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,262 the court acknowledged that
because of Rule 81(c)(1), the FRCP apply to a case removed to federal court
as a “general matter.”263 However, the Carden court overcame this general
rule by analyzing § 1448’s text.264 Specifically, the court interpreted § 1448
as providing two options when state court service of process was unperfected
or defective prior to removal: completion of state court service and issuance
of new process under Rule 4.265 Because the defendant had apparently
conceded that multiple attempts at service via state court process had
occurred, the court found that the defendant was properly served.266 The
Carden court did not see Rule 81(c)(1) and § 1448 as irrevocably in conflict
when it comes to allowing state court service of process to be completed after
removal. This finding is in contrast with those in Bruley, Cowen, and Amtrust
North America, which found that Rule 81(c)(1) disallowed completion of
256. Id. at *4–5.
257. Id. at *5.
258. No. 05-0959, 2006 WL 1391433 (S.D. W. Va. May 17, 2006).
259. See id. at *1–2.
260. Id. at *1.
261. Id. at *2.
262. 574 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D. W. Va. 2008). The court in Carden was not analyzing a
Rule 12(b)(4) or 12(b)(5) motion; rather, the court had to decide whether a defendant was
properly served so that the court could rule on the plaintiff’s motion to remand and another
defendant’s fraudulent joinder claim. Id. at 586.
263. Id. at 587.
264. See id. at 587–88.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 588.
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state court service of process after removal precisely because the service did
not conform with the requirements of Rule 4.
III. RISING ABOVE REFINEMENTS AND SUBTLETIES: SECTION 1448
SHOULD PERMIT COMPLETION OF STATE COURT SERVICE OF PROCESS
ISSUED BUT NOT SERVED PRIOR TO REMOVAL
The differing opinions as to the proper interpretation of § 1448 view
§ 1448 as having two exclusive options: either state court service of process
can be completed after removal, or it cannot. And courts that find that state
court service of process cannot be completed do so because of important
considerations—concerns about the balance of state and federal jurisdiction,
valid interpretations of the statutory language, the sufficiency of the notice
of the action and the removal given to defendants, and careful attention to the
requirements of the FRCP and the Judicial Code.
Acknowledging these valid concerns, Part III.A explains that § 1448 must
permit completion of state court service of process after removal according
to the classic tools of statutory interpretation. However, the concerns raised
in Beecher and its progeny cannot and should not be ignored: Part III.B
argues that an interpretation of § 1448 that allows for completion of state
court process after removal should and can be reconciled with Beecher’s
original reservations. Finally, Part III.C argues that courts that have
persisting concerns should not preemptively dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint,
but rather, should consider a plaintiff’s reliance on a reasonable interpretation
of § 1448 based on the split in authority as “good cause” for failing to serve
under Rule 4(m) and extend the time to serve as a last resort.
A. Section 1448 Permits Completion of State Court Service of Process
Completion of state court service of process falls squarely within § 1448’s
contemplated remedies according to the classic tools of statutory
interpretation. These tools include the rule against surplusage, the
presumption of the disjunctive “or,” and the rule of the last antecedent.
The rule against surplusage when applied to § 1448267 suggests that words
and phrases such as “not been served with process,” “completed,” and “or”
must be given full expression.268 This includes allowing state court process
that has not been served prior to removal to be completed after removal, or
allowing plaintiffs to obtain new process issued pursuant to the FRCP. By
providing a remedy under both options—completed or new process issued—

267. The full text of § 1448 is reproduced here for ease of reference:
In all cases removed from any State court to any district court of the United States
in which any one or more of the defendants has not been served with process or in
which the service has not been perfected prior to removal, or in which process served
proves to be defective, such process or service may be completed or new process
issued in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court.
28 U.S.C. § 1448.
268. See cases cited supra note 97.
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each clause in the statute is given full expression.269 If the alternative
interpretation were adopted, the words “completed” and “or” would be
rendered meaningless. There would be no service to complete when a
defendant is unserved because the only remedy available would be to have
new process issued by the federal court. Furthermore, the “or” would be
meaningless because only one option would remain when a defendant is
unserved prior to removal, defeating the statute’s inclusion of two remedies
separated by an “or.” Consequently, the phrase “such process or service may
be completed” would be swallowed entirely by the phrase “new process
issued.” This is counter to the rule against surplusage.
The rule of a disjunctive “or”270 when applied to § 1448 suggests that
§ 1448 provides plaintiffs with two distinct options after removal. The two
methods of service in the statute are separated by an “or”: “[S]uch process
or service may be completed or new process issued in the same manner as in
cases originally filed in such district court.”271 The second “or” signifies that
the two options are intended to be disjunctive and should be treated
separately. Completion of service and new process issued should therefore
have different meanings, with completion of service referring to state service
procedure, and new process issued referring to federal service procedure.272
If the opposite interpretation were adopted, then the modifier “in the same
manner” would be applied to both options as though they were effectively
the same. Even the Beecher court did not consider this interpretation
possible, as it saw completion of state court service of process applicable to
different scenarios contemplated by the statute than those situations which
required issuance of new, federal process.273
Applying the rule of the last antecedent274 to § 1448 suggests that state
court service is permitted to be “completed” or “new process issued in the
same manner” as in the federal court.275 The modifier “new process issued
in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court” would
only be applied to the phrase right before it, “new process issued.” Thus,
“such service or process may be completed” is not constrained by that
modifier and clearly refers to state service of process, allowing for such
service to be completed.
Standing alone, the rule of the last antecedent can be overcome,276 but
other indicia in § 1448 clearly suggest that the modifier was intended to apply
to both completion of service and to issuance of new process.277 Indeed,
court interpretations of § 1448 are aligned with the rule of the last antecedent:
269. For examples of district courts that have used this rule to interpret § 1448, see supra
text accompanying notes 198, 214–15, 231.
270. See supra note 96.
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (emphasis added).
272. For applications of the presumption of a disjunctive “or” applied to § 1448 in practice,
see supra text accompanying notes 200–01, 238–40.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 112–17.
274. See supra note 93.
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1448.
276. See supra note 93.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55.
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“such process or service” and “completion” within the statute seem to refer
to state court service of process, not federal service,278 and the separation of
the two remedies with an “or” indicates that the two are to be treated
differently. Because the statute’s meaning does not suggest otherwise, the
rule of the last antecedent should not be overcome.
B. Reconciling § 1448’s Intended Meaning with Beecher’s Concerns
Courts should allow plaintiffs to complete service using state court process
under § 1448, not only because the text of § 1448 requires it, but also because
completion of such service does not jeopardize Beecher’s original concerns
about overreaching federal jurisdiction and insufficient notice,279 nor does it
ignore the requirements of the FRCP and the Judicial Code.280
1. Allowing Completion of State Court Service of Process Does Not
Encroach on State Court Jurisdiction
District courts that have not permitted completion of state court service of
process have done so partly because of Beecher’s concerns about federal
courts taking jurisdiction when the state court did not originally have it.281
However, allowing plaintiffs to complete service of state court process after
removal would not increase the federal courts’ jurisdiction.
Firstly, the concerns laid out in Beecher and its progeny about
overextending the jurisdiction of federal courts do not comport with § 1448’s
original purpose. Section 1448 was never intended to enhance the
jurisdiction of federal courts.282 Rather, § 1448 was meant to provide federal
courts with the power to issue process or complete service after removal in
situations where federal courts were hesitant to do so out of jurisdictional
concerns.283 This power was intended to prevent the burden of paying
unnecessary costs and refiling cases after they were dismissed.284 In many
cases where completion of state court service was not permitted after
removal, plaintiffs had their complaints dismissed or were ordered to re-serve
the defendants.285 Beecher’s concerns about federalism have caused
prolonged litigation and increased costs to plaintiffs in subsequent cases even
though § 1448 was intended to prevent this type of unnecessary burden.
Secondly, federal jurisdiction after removal has not been universally
understood in the same way that Beecher described it. At one time, the
jurisdiction that federal courts obtained after removal was debated: Justice
Story asserted that federal courts obtained appellate jurisdiction over the
removed action, but the Supreme Court later intimated that federal courts
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See supra text accompanying notes 223, 229, 233.
See supra Parts II.A, II.B.1, II.B.3.
See supra Part II.B.4.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra text accompanying note 76.
See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
See supra text accompanying notes 74–75.
See supra Part II.B.
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obtained original jurisdiction over removed actions.286 At least one modern
court has described removal jurisdiction as concurrent original
jurisdiction.287 The Beecher court’s view does not comport with the
Supreme Court’s current view of removal jurisdiction as original jurisdiction,
because Beecher described an all-or-nothing view of federal and state court
jurisdiction during the removal process, in which the state court must have
obtained jurisdiction through service before removal could vest all
jurisdiction in the federal court.288 Completion of state court service of
process would not give the federal court jurisdiction that the state court did
not originally obtain. Rather, completion of state court service of process is
harmonious with the most recent Supreme Court formulation of removal
jurisdiction as concurrent original jurisdiction. The federal district courts’
removal jurisdiction overlaps with state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction, and,
accordingly, federal district courts should be respectful of state court process
(and the plaintiffs who seek to comply with it after removal), particularly
because modern procedural requirements permit defendants to remove cases
unilaterally by notice. Therefore, allowing completion of state court service
of process after removal would not extend or enhance the federal courts’
jurisdiction, but rather, would allow the federal courts to retain their rightful
original jurisdiction over the removed case by permitting plaintiffs to satisfy
the procedural requirement289 of service.
2. State Court Service of Process Can Provide Defendants
with Actual Notice
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Beecher regarding jurisdiction was
intertwined with its understanding of the purpose of service as providing
actual notice to defendants.290 Courts that have refused to permit completion
of state court service of process have done so partly because they found that
state court process provided insufficient notice to defendants of both the
pending action and the status of removal. However, other district courts have
found that state court service of process is sufficient to put the defendant on
notice of the pending action and the removal, and thus permit completion of
state court service of process.
State court process can put a defendant on notice of the pending
litigation291 because state court process documents often include a copy of
the complaint.292 When process does not include a copy of the complaint,
286. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
287. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
288. See Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1967) (describing when the state
court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant through service).
289. See supra text accompanying note 44.
290. See Beecher, 381 F.2d at 373.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 242–48.
292. See Hartman, supra note 50 (compiling state statutory process requirements and
finding that thirteen states—Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin—do not
appear to require serving a copy of the complaint with the summons).
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the summons makes clear that the defendant has a specified time within
which to respond to the plaintiff’s allegations and indicates that the defendant
has a claim pending against them that they must answer or risk default.293
The summons, or the summons and the complaint, contains sufficient
information to put the defendant on notice that there is an action pending
against them and notifies the defendant of how to respond.
Furthermore, defendants are often separately put on notice of the removal
status.294 28 U.S.C. § 1446 requires the removing defendant to serve a copy
of the notice of removal on all adverse parties, to file a copy of the notice
with the state court, and to obtain consent for removal from any earlier-served
defendant.295 These requirements provide many opportunities for defendants
other than the removing defendant to be notified of a case’s removal.
Therefore, state court service of process, when completed according to the
requirements of the Judicial Code’s removal procedure, does not always
deprive the defendant of actual notice. Courts should therefore permit
completion of state court service of process when the defendant was provided
with actual notice through service.
Some courts may still have reservations about the sufficiency of notice
provided by state court process.296 For example, state court process
documents may provide insufficient notice of the claims against a defendant
when state law does not require serving the defendant with a copy of the
complaint.297 Additionally, when a case falls outside the scope of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446, the defendant may not have actual notice that the case was removed
to federal court. These concerns are valid, but in these instances, the remedy
should not be dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. Part III.C. argues that
insufficient state court service of process can be remedied without dismissing
plaintiff’s case through a showing of good cause under Rule 4(m) to allow
for extended time to serve.
3. Harmonization of Service Under § 1448, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Judicial Code
Completion of state court service of process does not conflict with either
the FRCP or the Judicial Code.
Completion of state court service of process is not only contemplated
under § 1448, but also under Rule 4. Rule 4 allows for service to be made
by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in” state
courts where the district court is located or where the service is made.298
Rule 4 therefore fuses state and federal procedure for service. Courts that
have permitted completion of state court service of process under § 1448
293. See id.
294. See supra Part II.B.2.
295. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b)(2)(C), 1446(d).
296. See supra Part II.B.2.
297. See Hartman, supra note 50.
298. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1), 4(g), 4(h)(1)(A). These provisions of Rule 4 provide for
conformity among federal and state procedures for service, but not for process.
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have acknowledged that requiring plaintiffs to re-serve would be redundant,
as the only real difference would be the inclusion of a federal summons.299
Therefore, Rule 81(c)(1), which mandates the use of federal procedure after
removal, can often be satisfied through state court service of process in
compliance with Rule 4’s service procedure.
Completion of state court service of process also complies with relevant
sections of the Judicial Code. Beecher and its successors were concerned
about federal courts usurping jurisdiction from state courts, but § 1448 is not
the only section of the Judicial Code where state court orders retain their
efficacy after removal. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1450 allows state court
sequestrations and attachments to retain efficacy after removal in the same
manner as in the original state court.300 Section 1450 also provides that state
court “injunctions, orders, and other proceedings” remain in full force after
removal until the district court provides otherwise.301 It is therefore not
anomalous for state court process documents to similarly retain efficacy after
removal when § 1448 allows for their completion. Thus, courts should allow
state court process documents to retain their efficacy after removal.
Furthermore, the FRCP have been interpreted to favor adjudication on the
merits rather than dismissal based on procedural technicalities.302 Because
the burden to prove sufficiency of service is on the plaintiffs, allowing
completion of state court service of process after removal furthers this
policy303: plaintiffs could more easily satisfy service procedure and proceed
to the merits of their case rather than defend against Rule 12(b)(4) and
12(b)(5) motions if completion of state court service of process was allowed
after removal. Courts could therefore more easily reach the merits of the
plaintiff’s case.
C. A Good Cause Exemption for a Plaintiff’s Reasonable Reliance on an
Interpretation of § 1448
Completion of state court service should be considered sufficient service
under § 1448, but courts may still have persistent concerns about the
inadequacy of state court service of process after removal. But, instead of
dismissing the plaintiff’s case, courts should extend the time to serve so that
the plaintiff can cure any inadequacies in the original service.
Courts have wide discretion to extend the time to serve under Rule 4(m),
but courts must extend the time to serve if the plaintiff demonstrates “good
cause” for failure to serve within the time provided.304 Courts should
299. E.g., Carden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 582, 588 n.4 (S.D. W. Va.
2008); see, e.g., Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Protos Shipping, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 979,
982 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1450.
301. Id.
302. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Certain sections of the Judicial Code have
also been interpreted to disfavor interruption of the case’s merits, but such interpretations do
not concern § 1448. See supra note 36.
304. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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consider a plaintiff’s completion of service using state court process after
removal as demonstrating good cause for their failure to comply with Rule
4(m), which would necessarily provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to
correctly serve the defendants without the unnecessary expense of dismissal
and refiling.
Although the standard for good cause varies by jurisdiction, good cause is
generally found when the plaintiff has made a diligent effort to effectuate
proper service.305 In the case of § 1448, serving state court process after
removal has been considered by many courts to be a valid method of service.
Moreover, even district courts within the same circuit have disagreed on the
validity of state court service after removal,306 so it can be difficult for
plaintiffs to know which method of service would be accepted in any given
district. Plaintiffs who have served state court process and have made a
diligent effort to effectuate proper service under a reasonable interpretation
of § 1448 or a belief that service had been appropriately accomplished under
§ 1448307 should be given extended time to serve under Rule 4(m).
At least one court has suggested that reasonable reliance on an
interpretation of § 1448 that allows state court service of process after
removal would constitute a showing of good cause.308 Courts have also
frequently extended the time to serve for plaintiffs who serve state court
process after removal, even when concluding that the state court service after
removal was invalid.309 Extension for time to serve is therefore a familiar
and related concept for courts dealing with the § 1448 issue. However, these
extensions are granted at the discretion of the district court. Including service
of state court process under § 1448 within the good cause standard would
instead mandate the extension of time to serve, creating a uniform process
for plaintiffs among all districts.
Use of the good cause standard is also a feasible solution for district courts
dealing with the § 1448 issue because an analysis under the good cause
standard would likely be based on the same facts as an analysis of the validity
of service under § 1448.310 The good cause analysis would therefore be no
305. 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, § 1137 n.6.
306. See, e.g., Orner v. Int’l Lab’ys Inc., No. 20-CV-00449, 2020 WL 6710277, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Nov. 16, 2020) (“[O]ther districts within the Third Circuit have split on the question.”);
M.A. v. KFC Corp., No. 17-CV-03114, 2018 WL 4233814, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2018)
(“District courts in the Fifth Circuit have differing views on whether state issued service can
be utilized once a case has been removed to federal court.”), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 17-CV-03114, 2018 WL 4232920 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2018).
307. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
308. Orner, 2020 WL 9749413, at *2 (finding that the plaintiff’s service was based on a
reasonable interpretation of § 1448 and agreeing that confusion about service requirements
constitutes a showing of good cause (citing Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 516
(3d Cir. 1988))).
309. See, e.g., KFC Corp., 2018 WL 4233814, at *5; Howse v. Zimmer Mfg. Inc., 109
F.R.D. 628, 631 (D. Mass. 1986); DiCesare-Engler Prods., Inc. v. Mainman Ltd., 421 F. Supp.
116, 121 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Codrington v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., No. 19-CV-00026, 2019
WL 3554698, at *2 (D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2019).
310. For an example of how § 1448 and extension for time to serve analyses could overlap,
see supra text accompanying notes 250–57.
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more labor intensive than an analysis of the validity of service, for both the
plaintiff—who has the burden of establishing good cause311—and the court.
The good cause standard would provide courts with a fair remedy when
plaintiffs have completed state court service but the service is still deficient
in other aspects, such as when plaintiffs provide insufficient notice to
defendants about the pending case or the status of removal. In those cases,
the court would identify the deficiencies in the plaintiff’s original service,
and the plaintiff would have an opportunity to correct those deficiencies. For
example, if the court found that the state court summons did not provide the
defendant with sufficient notice that the case had been removed, the court
could grant an extension, and the plaintiff could re-serve the defendant with
a federal summons.312 This would allow courts to effectuate sufficient
service on the defendant while also reaching the merits of the case.
Section 1448 has endured many interpretations in the last half-century, and
yet the statute has still fallen prey to the age-old adage about removal
procedure: section 1448 has become subject to the “refinements and
subtleties”313 of removal proceedings. But these procedural hoops must not
unduly prejudice plaintiffs like Jeffrey Wade314 who have made good faith
efforts to comply with the service requirement. When plaintiffs have
attempted in good faith to provide defendants with actual notice of the action
against them and its removal, when plaintiffs have been respectful of federal
jurisdiction and procedure, and when plaintiffs have relied on a reasonable
interpretation of § 1448, their case should be heard on its merits. From its
inception, § 1448 was intended as a barrier between plaintiffs and the useless
expense of multiple filings and prolonged litigation.315 Jeffrey Wade and
plaintiffs like him deserve the full protection of that barrier today.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1448 must allow completion of state
court service of process issued but not served prior to removal, despite many
court opinions to the contrary. District courts and one circuit court have held
that § 1448 does not permit plaintiffs to complete service after removal with
state court process. Other districts have held that state court service of
process retains its efficacy for service after removal under § 1448. Both sides
have based their interpretations of § 1448 on concerns about an overreaching
federal jurisdiction, on the sufficiency of the notice provided to the defendant
through service, and on respect for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
federal removal procedure statutes.
311. See supra text accompanying note 70.
312. See, e.g., Jeong Hae Lee v. Winix, Inc., No. 05-8999, 2006 WL 8434724, at *3, *5
(C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006) (ordering the plaintiff to re-serve the defendants with a federal
summons rather than dismiss the case when it was clear that the plaintiff could complete
service on the defendants).
313. Hagerla v. Miss. River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912).
314. Wade v. Black Clawson, No. 89-2385, 1989 WL 138735 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1989); see
supra text accompanying notes 1–12.
315. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
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The legacy of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Beecher v. Wallace reveals
the consequences of a court reaching the wrong conclusion for the right
reasons. Issues of federalism and providing actual notice to defendants
through service are incredibly important and deserve careful consideration
when determining whether service is effective. However, authorization of
state court process after removal does not detract from these concerns.
Rather, allowing state court service of process under § 1448 would allow
courts to reach plaintiffs’ cases on the merits more quickly and easily without
enhancing the federal court’s jurisdiction, and would not conflict with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or federal removal procedure statutes.
Moreover, classic interpretive tools and canons of statutory interpretation,
including the rule of the last antecedent, the presumption of the disjunctive
“or,” and the rule against surplusage suggest that § 1448 permits completion
of state court service of process after removal. Unless such completion is
permitted under § 1448, plaintiffs will continue to incur the unnecessary
expense and prolonged litigatory consequences of re-serving defendants or
refiling their cases after dismissal, and § 1448’s intended purpose will never
be fully realized.
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APPENDIX A: DISTRICT COURT CASES QUASHING COMPLETION OF STATE
COURT SERVICE OF PROCESS AFTER REMOVAL UNDER § 1448
Case Name

District

Citation

Date Decided

Alexander
Technologies, Inc. v.
International
Frontier Forwarders,
Inc.

S.D. Tex.

No. H-05-2598,
2006 WL 3694517

Dec. 14, 2006

Amtrust North
America v.
Sennebogen
Maschinenfabrik
GmbH

M.D. Fla.

No. 19-CV-1004,
2020 WL 5441407

Aug. 25, 2020

Bruley v. Lincoln
Property Co.

D. Colo.

140 F.R.D. 452

Dec. 31, 1991

Club One Casino,
Inc. v. Sarantos

E.D. Cal.

No. 17-CV-00818,
2017 WL 4123935

Sept. 18, 2017

Codrington v. Arch
Specialty Insurance
Co.

D.V.I.

No. 19-CV-00026,
2019 WL 3554698

Aug. 5, 2019

Cowen v. American
Medical Systems, Inc.

E.D.
Mich.

411 F. Supp. 2d
717

Jan. 31, 2006

DiCesare-Engler
Productions, Inc. v.
Mainman Ltd.

W.D. Pa.

412 F. Supp. 116

Oct. 19, 1976

Hakim v. Bay Sales
Corp.

D.N.J.

No. 06-6088,
2007 WL 2752077

Sept. 17, 2007

Howse v. Zimmer
Manufacturing, Inc.

D. Mass.

109 F.R.D. 628

Mar. 12, 1986

Ibarra v. City of
Clovis

D.N.M.

No. 04-1253,
2005 WL 8163456

Dec. 14, 2005

Jeong Hae Lee v.
Winix, Inc.

C.D. Cal.

No. 05-8999,
2006 WL 8434724

July 24, 2006

Ketchmark v.
Brown-Williamson
Tobacco Corp.

D. Haw.

No. 18-00079,
2018 WL 3451450

July 17, 2018

Seesing v. Miller

E.D. Ky.

No. 21-CV-26,
2021 WL 3410041

Aug. 4, 2021
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Case Name

District

Citation

Date Decided

M.A. v. KFC Corp.

S.D. Tex.

No. 17-CV-03114,
2018 WL 4233814

July 13, 2018

Patterson v. Brown

W.D.N.C. No. 06CV476,
2008 WL 219965,
rev’d on other
grounds sub nom.
Patterson v.
Whitlock, 392
F. App’x 185 (4th
Cir. 2010) (per
curiam)

Jan. 24, 2008

Tadco Construction
Corp. v. Peri
Framework Systems,
Inc.

E.D.N.Y.

460 F. Supp. 2d
408

Nov. 6, 2006

Tanus Cabinets
Designs, Inc. v.
Central Transport
L.L.C.

D. Nev.

No. 14-CV-00059,
2014 WL 2863139

June 24, 2014

Wade v. Black
Clawson

D.N.J.

No. 89-2385,
1989 WL 138735

Nov. 17, 1989

Warden v. DirecTV,
L.L.C.

D.N.M.

92 F. Supp. 3d
1140

Mar. 23, 2015
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APPENDIX B: DISTRICT COURTS ALLOWING COMPLETION OF STATE
COURT SERVICE OF PROCESS AFTER REMOVAL UNDER § 1448
Case Name

District

Citation

Date Decided

Baumeister v. New
Mexico Commission
for the Blind

D.N.M.

409 F. Supp. 2d
1351

Jan. 6, 2006

Carden v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.

S.D.
W. Va.

574 F. Supp. 2d
582

Sept. 5, 2008

Cline v. North Central
Life Insurance Co.

S.D.
W. Va.

No. 05-0959,
2006 WL 1391433

May 17, 2006

Continental Illinois
National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Protos
Shipping, Inc.

N.D. Ill.

472 F. Supp. 979

May 14, 1979

Southers v.
Appalachian Regional
Healthcare, Inc.

E.D. Ky.

No. 20-CR-126,
2021 WL 1250315

Apr. 5, 2021

Dean Marketing, Inc.
E.D.
v. A.O.C. International Mich.
(U.S.A.) Ltd.

610 F. Supp. 149

May 29, 1985

Jernigan v. Kubota
Corp.

M.D.
Ala.

No. 11-CV-834,
2012 WL
13001791

July 31, 2012

Listle v. Milwaukee
County

E.D.
Wis.

926 F. Supp. 826

Mar. 13, 1996

Minter v. Showcase
Systems, Inc.

S.D.
Miss.

641 F. Supp. 2d
597

June 30, 2009

Orner v. International
Laboratories, Inc.

M.D. Pa.

No. 20-CV-00449,
2020 WL 6710277

Nov. 16, 2020

Oscar Ubaldo Garcia,
Inc. v. Allied Property
& Casualty Insurance
Co.

W.D.
Tex.

No. 17-CV-00243,
2017 WL
11221429

Nov. 28, 2017

Queen v. Schmidt

D.D.C.

No. 10-2017,
2015 WL 5175712

Sept. 3, 2015

Reed v. City of
Cleveland

N.D.
Ohio

No. 04CV0546,
2006 WL 3861082

Sept. 6, 2006

Schmude v. Sheahan

N.D. Ill.

214 F.R.D. 487

Apr. 29, 2003
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Case Name

District

Citation

Date Decided

Scott v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co.

W.D.
Ark.

No. 06-CV-4057,
2007 WL 215804

Jan. 25, 2007

Spiritbank v. McCarty

N.D.
Okla.

No. 08-CV-675,
2009 WL 1159747

Apr. 22, 2009

